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Abstract 
 
In this paper we describe our use of the STAMP architecture to 
analyse the C. difficile infection outbreaks which occurred at the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells NHS trust. Background data 
from other outbreaks in the UK (e.g., at Stoke Mandeville NHS 
trust) were also used to build STAMP models. The specification 
uses components of STAMP such as negative and positive 
feedback loops to represent the degree to which decisions taken 
at a higher level in the system (e.g., bed turnover targets) 
impacted upon system components at lower levels (e.g., the 
morale and attitude of staff at ward level). In addition, the 
specification includes elements which aim to model the degree to 
which organisational learning was inhibited or facilitated within 
the system (e.g., through the provision of balancing loops – 
Kontogiannis, in press). Finally, we examine the role played by 
the different types of mental model held by the various human 
actors in the system and how these change over time/are 
impacted by external constraints. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The last few years have seen an increase in activity and 
enthusiasm in using ideas from systems thinking and systems 
dynamics to model aspects of healthcare systems (e.g., hospitals, 
disease pathways). Homer and Hirsch [9] for example, argue that 
systems dynamics facilitates the modelling of a range of risk 
management factors such as hospital resources, human behaviour 
and violations to patient safety. Much of this type of work has 
been carried out on public health issues (e.g., disease screening, 
workforce planning) and has primarily involved researchers with 
expertise in operational research (OR).  
 
At the same time, researchers in human factors and ergonomics 
have attempted to use risk management models (e.g., Rasmussen, 
[16]; Leveson, [12]) to understand the interaction between 
components of complex sociotechnical systems, particularly 
where these systems degrade over time and accidents/disasters 
occur as a result (e.g., infection outbreaks – Vicente and 
Christoffersen, []).  
In our paper we describe the steps we have so far taken to bring 
together the perspectives offered by systems dynamics modelling 
and human factors accident frameworks in order to better 
understand the tendency of some complex sociotechnical 
systems, particularly hospitals, to „drift to failure‟ (Hollnagel et 
al., [8]). In the next section we briefly review current work on the 
application of simulation and modeling techniques to hospital-
acquired infections. 
 
 
2 Simulation and modeling of hospital infections 
 
The subject of hospital infection control and prevention has 
recently become the subject of much media attention in the UK 
(e.g., BBC Panorama, [2]). A number of high profile hospital 
outbreaks within the UK involving bacterium such as Clostridium 
difficile (C..diff.) and MRSA (Methicillin-resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus) have raised infection control into a 
central priority for the UK NHS and other health care systems 
worldwide (Allegranzi et al., [1]). It is estimated that about 9% of 
patients in UK hospitals have a hospital-acquired infection. The 
costs of increased lengths of stay in hospital and treatment are 
thought to be around £1000 million a year (Noah, [15]).  
 
One response to this problem has been to build mathematical 
models and use techniques from operational research to simulate 
infection outbreaks and design interventions for their prevention. 
Grundmann and Hellriegel [5] for example, provide a review of 
the mathematical models which have been developed over the 
years. Stochastic models have proved to be every common, these 
involve the use of data relating to frequency of hand washing and 
resource levels (e.g., number of isolation beds or staff time), 
setting parameter values for these and then using random 
variabilities built into the model to calculate the likelihood of 
infections spreading. An alternative approach, drawn from OR is 
to use agent-based models to simulate patients (e.g., colonization, 
treatment and location within the ward). Meng et al. [14] have 
used an agent-based architecture to suggest assess a range of 
policies for the treatment of MRSA (e.g., screening tests, 
decolonization treatment). 
 
Most modelling efforts have so far focused on using infection-
related parameters as inputs, little work has examined the role 
played by behavioral factors, particularly those that cut across a 
range of levels of analysis (i.e., individual, group and 
organisational) and involve other actors outside of the immediate 
hospital environment (e.g., NHS regulators). In order to 
demonstrate the value and importance of this these types of 
considerations, we describe in section 3 the background to a set 
of recent outbreaks in the UK relating to the C. difficile 
bacterium. 
 
 
3 Recent hospital outbreaks of C. difficile in the 
UK 
 
C. diff. is the major cause of serious bacterial infectious diarrhoea 
acquired in hospitals in the UK and is particularly resistant to 
drying, chemical disinfectants and alcohol. The number of cases 
of C. difficile and reported deaths has increased within the UK in 
the last few years and similar outbreaks have occurred at a 
number of hospitals (e.g., Stoke Mandeville – Healthcare 
Commission, [7]).  Recommendations for the prevention of the 
spread of the bacteria include: the timely isolation of known and 
suspected cases; the control of antibiotics; the application of high 
standards of hygiene; and, the restriction of the movements of 
patients.  
 
The outbreaks of bacterium C. difficile occurred at the Maidstone 
and Tunbridge Well NHS Trust between 2005-2007 and resulted 
in the death of approximately 90 people. The Healthcare 
Commission‟s investigation report in 2007 [6] identified five 
main factors which contributed to the outbreaks: (1) Lack of 
adequate coordination between external organisations and 
regulators; (2) The style of management and leadership within the 
hospital trust; (3) Poor clinical management and decision-making 
on the hospital wards; (4) Management of the infection control 
team; and, (5) Inadequate levels or hygiene and run-down 
buildings/equipment. 
 
Based upon these findings, Waterson [21] used Rasmussen‟s [16] 
risk management framework to analyse potential whole system 
and cross-level relationships within the report findings (figure 1). 
For example, one of factors that appears to have shaped decision-
making across the various levels of the system (e.g., regulatory, 
trust governance, clinical management levels) is likely to have 
been financial and bed occupancy targets set by other actors 
within the system (e.g., the Strategic Health Authority acting on 
behalf of the Government). Decision-making within the system as 
a whole showed characteristics of what Weick and Sutcliffe [22] 
found in their analysis of the Bristol Royal Infirmary report, in 
that staff became locked in patterns of behaviour without 
challenging the likely adverse impact these would have on 
patients. 
 
Based upon the outcomes form this work we decided to use some 
of the elements from Leveson‟s [12] STAMP methodology to 
further explore the dynamic inter-relationships that exist between 
factors leading up over time to the outbreaks and system 
components. STAMP was chosen partly because it uses elements 
of the risk management framework and provides a means of 
considering the role dynamics multi-level relationships of in 
accident causation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Cross-level relationships in the Maidstone and 
Tunbridge Wells Outbreak [21] 
 
 
4 Using STAMP to simulate the outbreaks 
 
4.1 The STAMP architecture 
 
From the various papers written about STAMP (e.g., [11], [12]) it 
is difficult precisely identify the main components of the 
architecture. In order to facilitate analysis we have used the 
description given by Leveson in her analysis of the Walkerton 
outbreak of e. Coli in Canada [12]. This version of STAMP 
consists of the following components: (1) a model of the 
organisational safety structure control structure; (2) a model of 
the dynamics and pressure that lead to system degradation over 
time; (3) process models that required to control and maintain the 
system (including feedback and communication requirements). 
 
4.2 Steps in using STAMP 
 
Our first step in using STAMP was to consolidate the findings 
from two of the recent outbreaks in the UK (Maidstone and Stoke 
Mandeville, [6], [7]). This involved looking at the commonalities 
between the outbreaks and then organizing these into causal 
maps.  An example drawn from the Maidstone outbreak is shown 
in figure 2. This, along with outline data from the Stoke 
Mandeville outbreak, was used as the basis for the three steps 
followed by Leveson in her use of STAMP with the Walkerton 
outbreak (sections 4.4.1-4.2.3) 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Causal mapping between contributory factors in the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells outbreak [21] 
 
 
4.2.1 Safety control structure 
 
Figure 3 shows an example of the safety control structure which 
was constructed on the basis of the two infection outbreaks. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: STAMP safety control structure based on [6], [7], [21]. 
 
The safety control structure is an attempt to identify the main 
system hazards, safety constraints and the overall control 
structure which enforces these. Each component within the 
overall control structure has a set of safety constraints associated 
with it. For example, the infection control teams in both 
outbreaks were responsible for providing training and 
information to ward staff, in addition to carrying other functions 
such as advising and feedback regarding infection 
policy/procedure to senior managers within the hospital. 
 
4.2.2 Changes over time leading up to the outbreaks 
 
Identifying exactly the nature of system degradation or „drift to 
failure‟ within the two outbreaks involves some conjecture and 
inference in order to fill in missing information. The reports on 
both outbreaks provide some detail of the various contributory 
factors leading up to the outbreaks, but accounts of how this 
changed over time are limited. Nevertheless, it is possible, based 
on accounts of other health care accidents as well as the general 
context of changes within the NHS, to suggest how the various 
aspects of the safety control structure changed over time. 
 
At the very highest („macro‟) level of the system government 
targets placed many individuals, particularly those at trust board 
and management levels under a great deal of pressure. Within the 
trusts it is likely that targets exerted considerable pressure on the 
system as a whole and this pressure filtered down various levels of 
the system. The drive to comply with these targets increased the 
likelihood of an adverse event or set of events taking place at some 
stage within the trust.  
 
The creation of the Health Protection Agency (HPA) in April 2005 
coincided with the first outbreak at the Maidstone and Tunbridge 
Wells trust. The remit of the HPA is to provide advice and support 
to NHS, local authorities and other agencies with regard to public 
health issues. One part of the HPA, the health protection unit 
(HPU), is to support organisations in their management of 
infections. The investigation report [] highlighted the confusion 
this caused within the trust at the time of the outbreaks as the 
expectation was that the HPU could give provide guidance 
covering the supervision and monitoring of infection control. 
Similar problems were encountered within the much larger 
Strategic Health Authority (SHA), the report mentions that until 
recently the SHA were more focused on outbreaks of other 
healthcare associated infections (e.g., MRSA), partly because these 
were at the time of the outbreaks one of the national priority to 
which performance targets were attached. One possibility in the 
case of the HPA and other regulatory bodies is that over time 
regulatory enforcement procedures, particularly with regard to C. 
difficile took on some of the characteristics of other management 
failings within other parts of the system (e.g., confusion of 
responsibilities). This type of so-called „agency capture‟ as been 
shown to occur in other descriptions of accidents and disasters and 
the changes which occur over time (e.g., []). 
 
The style of leadership within the trusts and the overall 
management culture were also problematic. Within Maidstone 
staff described the leadership of the chief executive as being 
“autocratic” or “dictatorial”. In addition, the person appointed as 
director of infection prevention and control had “no real 
understanding of the role at the outset” [6, p.5]. Turnover of 
managers and directors was high. Between September 2002 and 
September 2006 five people attended the board in five roles as 
director or director of finance [6, p. 91]. Despite weekly meetings 
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there was little evidence of managers working collaboratively to 
address problem. Managers were often under considerable stress 
and in fear of losing their jobs [6, p. 92]. Likewise most staff 
were afraid to speak out and raise concerns about what was 
happening within the trust. 
 
Finally at lower („micro‟) levels of the system, the behaviour of 
clinicians and other health care professionals within the trust shares 
similarities with those of senior managers and trust board 
managers. Many individuals at ward level were aware of the levels 
of poor hygiene and inadequate patient monitoring practices, but 
saw no way to improve the situation. Other researchers have 
suggested that in such cases individuals fall into the trap of 
routinely carrying out their work without challenging assumptions 
or questioning the consequences of what they are doing 
(“involuntary automaticity” – [18]). In such cases organisational 
learning throughout the system is inhibited and the ability to adapt 
and learn from failure results in patterns of negative reinforcement 
which, in turn, act as a barrier to change and improvement [22].  
 
4.2.3 Dynamic process model 
 
The third step in using the STAMP methodology involves using 
the static description of the control structure together with 
changes to this structure over time, to build a dynamic control 
structure. The purpose of this is to identify why the system 
changed over time [11, p. 191] and uses systems dynamics to 
cary out modeling of feedback loops and time delays. Figure 4 
shows one part of the dynamic process model for the Maidstone 
and Tunbridge Wells outbreak. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Example dynamic process model of infection outbreak 
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
Our use of the STAMP architecture follows on from a systems 
analysis using Rasmussen‟s Risk Management (ActorMap) 
Framework [16]. In general we found that following the three 
steps leading up to the construction of a dynamic process model 
help to provide further insights into the outbreaks. These went 
beyond our earlier analysis [21] in that they helped to highlight a 
number of aspects of the outbreaks that warrant further 
investigation.  
 
Our earlier work had focused on the role of cross-level and whole 
system relationships in causing the outbreaks (figures 1 and 2). 
By contrast, the construction of the control structure and dynamic 
process model provided another way of looking at the issue of 
how the various trusts drifted into eventual failure. Putting 
together the elements in figure 4 for example, helped to 
operationalise the tendency of all of the actors within the systems 
to become complacent over time about the level of risk associated 
with the C. difficile infection. The gap between the situation 
awareness of senior managers within the trusts and ward staff is 
hinted at within the various investigation reports, but is not 
explicitly identified as a cause of the outbreaks. Lack of a shared 
mental model of the risk of infection across regulatory, 
management and staff system levels combined this „drift to 
complacency‟, was brought out by using STAMP.  In particular, 
the use of a systems dynamics format for the dynamic process 
model, helped to focus our attention on some of the „latent‟ 
causes of the outbreaks. Similar types of advantage have been 
described by other analyses using systems dynamics (e.g., 
Cooke‟s analysis of the Westray mine disaster – [3]). 
 
Our use of STAMP also pointed to some potential disadvantages 
of the architecture. Firstly, we found it difficult to identify 
exactly the core stages of analysis and what the exact procedure 
should be in carrying a STAMP analysis. Secondly, it proved to 
be easier to build the control structure to represent the main 
hazards and constraints within the trust, as compared to the 
dynamic process model. The latter involved a degree of 
arbitrariness and ambiguity in assigning attributes to the process 
model (figure 4). This may have been a side effect of the lack of 
detail regarding the actions/decisions of specific individuals and 
groups in the investigation reports. However, it seems that along 
with the identification of specific attributes, the assignment of 
positive/negative feedback loops involves a degree of subjectivity 
on the part of the analyst. As a result issues regarding the 
reliability of the methods (i.e., whether or not two or more 
analysts will arrive at similar conclusions) remain open and 
require further investigation. 
 
6 Future work 
 
The work we have described is in a very early stage. The various 
models which were derived from using STAMP need to be 
refined and developed further. In particular, the dynamic process 
model (figure 4) needs to be expanded and to take into account 
more detailed findings from other infection outbreak case studies. 
Part of the analysis pointed to the issue of the drift to 
complacency which seems to have been characteristic of both 
outbreaks. One potential future avenue of research is to focus on 
this more specifically.  Marais et al. [13] for example,  outline a 
set of archetypes for organisational safety alongside descriptions 
of associated process models for each. One of these archetypes 
concerns organisational complacency and how this phenomenon 
arises over time. The description of the process model could be 
used to further describe how complacency and apathy in the face 
of growing infection risk contributed to the outbreaks. In 
addition, the taxonomy of variability of organisational processes 
described by Kontogiannis [10]  could be used to examine further 
aspects of the outbreaks in ore depth. 
 
Our current work involves an attempt to build a small-scale 
computational simulation of components within the dynamic 
process model described above. STAMP has served as a basis for 
carrying out preliminary systems analysis and the precise choice 
of implementation (e.g., agent-based modeling, system dynamics  
environments) is yet to be made. These types of simulation are 
becoming more common, particularly within health care [17] and 
other domains where there is a need to further explore causal 
links between macro- and micro-system elements [23].   
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